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PRENATAL SUBSTANCE ABUSE: A
LEGISLATIVE ACTION IN MARYLAND

CALL

FOR

INTRODUCTION

I.

The alarming increase in chemical substance abuse in recent
history has left no segment of the population untouched. Even the
unborn are affected. In 1988, at least one thousand babies a day
were born to women who used illegal drugs during pregnancy. I The
future costs, both economic and emotional, of caring for these
damaged children will be significant, particularly because the problem
is increasing. 2 Unfortunately, the status of the fetus as a legal entity
that may be legally shielded from the untoward effects of drug and
alcohol abuse is questionable.
This Comment first reviews the medical effects of prenatal
substance abuse and related social issues. Second, this Comment
outlines the relevant legal implications, including constitutional considerations and various state treatments of the problem. Third, it
discusses the current status of Maryland law in this arena. Fourth,
it critiques and analyzes various approaches. Finally, it offers possible
alternatives to the Maryland approach.
II.

MEDICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES

Exact statistics on the number of infants exposed to drugs in
utero are lacking. 3 A major difficulty in obtaining this statistical data
is the lack of uniformity in testing and screening for prenatal substance abuse. 4 Many hospitals have no formal procedures for prenatal
substance abuse screening. s As a result, there is significant undercounting in any numbers that have been compiled. 6 Research indicates
that when screening and testing are uniformly applied, a much higher
incidence of drug-exposed infants are identified. 7 In one study, hos0/ Prenatal Substance
Abuse: An Analysis of Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L.J.

1. Michelle D. Wilkins, Comment, Solving the Problem

1401, 1401 (1990).
2.Id.
3. DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS: A GENERATION AT RISK, REpORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, U.S. SENATE, 4 (U.S. General Accounting
Office ed., 1990) [hereinafter GAO REpORT].
4.Id.
5. [d. at 5.
6. Id. at 4.
7.Id.
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pitals with rigorous detection procedures designed to identify maternal
drug exposure had an incidence rate three to five times greater than
that of hospitals without such screening procedures. 8 Detecting maternal drug exposure is further complicated by the apparent bias in
testing.9 While much of the public's attention has focused upon the
"crack cocaine" problems of poor inner city women, evidence from
blind studies suggests that the problem of prenatal drug use may be
similar to that of middle class America. 10
Although exact numbers are difficult to obtain, estimates indicate
that drug abuse in its many forms is a significant public health
problem. The National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) estimates
that "in 1988, five million women of childbearing age used illicit
drugs."JI The greatest increase in drug use since the 1970s has been
among young adults of child-bearing age who use' cocaine. 12 Experts
attribute this increase to the ready availability and low cost of crack
cocaine.13 As a result, "cocaine babies" now comprise 10-15070" of
the populations of urban neonatal nurseries and intensive care units
in major cities within the United States. 14'
Unfortunately, this 10-15% figure does not represent the entire
universe of prenatal drug exposure. Maternal prenatal ingestion of
alcohol, cigarettes, methadone, heroin, and other legal and street
drugs significantly contributes to this epidemic of "fetal abuse. "IS
Fetal alcohol syndrome is now the leading known cause of mental
retardation and birth defects.16 Cigarette smoking is estimated to
account for 20-40% of the prevalence of below normal birth weight
babies. 17 Maternal heroin and methadone addiction, among other

8.ld.
9. See Ira 1. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit Drug or Alcohol Use
During Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County,
Florida, 322 NEW ENG. 1. MED. 1202, 1205-06 (1990).
10. Id. at 1205. Some researchers studying prenatal drug use state the following:
"First, the overall prevalence of drug or alcohol use . . . was similar among
women who received care from private physicians and those cared for at public
health clinics. Second, the rate of substance use by pregnant women, as
documented at the first prenatal visit, was similar for whites and blacks." Id.
11. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 1.
12. Lynn Singer et al., Childhood Medical and Behavioral Consequences of Maternal Cocaine Use, 17 1. PEDIATRIC PSYCHOL. 389, 390 (1992).
13. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 1.
14. See Singer et al., supra note 12, at 390.
15. See generally Ira 1. Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters of Risk, 35
PEDIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 1403 (1988) [hereinafter Chasnoff, Parameters)
(discussing the types and consequences of various forms of prenatal substance
use).
16. LAWRENCE S. WISSOW, CHILD ADVOCACY FOR THE CLINICIAN: AN APPROACH
TO CHILD AB1,JSE AND NEGLECT 186 (1990).
17. Id.
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drugs, is responsible for prenatal growth retardation and neonatal
drug withdrawal syndromes. 19 Actual injury to the infant resulting
from fetal drug exposure may be substantial. In addition to the
damaging intrauterine effects of drugs and alcohol, there is clear
evidence of long term sequelae (i.e., after-effects). Fetal alcohol
syndrome is manifested by intrauterine and postnatal growth deficiency, microcephaly (small head and brain size), and facial anomalies.20 Additionally, mild to moderate mental retardation is common. 21
Many children born with fetal alcohol syndrome are later diagnosed
with hyperactivity and other emotional and behavioral disorders. 22
Maternal cocaine use reduces the supply of oxygen to the fetus,
causing the potential for later problems in neurological and cognitivebehavioral development. 23 For example, "[i]ntrauterine growth retardation, also known to be associated with later child development
problems, has been found in almost all studies comparing cocaineexposed to cocaine-free infants. "24 Cocaine-exposed infants suffer an
increased incidence of prematurity and its attendant complications. 2s
Of particular concern in cocaine exposure are the concomitant high
rates of infection, particularly from sexually transmitted diseases such
as syphilis and the human immunodeficiency virus26-diseases which
themselves have devastating consequences. These high rates of exposure to sexually transmitted diseases are attributed to the fact that
cocaine, and crack cocaine in particular, is a stimulant often used
communally, resulting in an increased frequency of sexual activity. 27
Studies of the development and behavior of cocaine-exposed
infants beyond three years of age are lacking. 28 According to studies
of young children who were exposed to cocaine as infants, early
treatment intervention aids both developmental lags and behavioral
problems. 29 However, it is clear that these children required some
1993]

18. Chasnoff, Parameters, supra note 15, at 1406.

19. Id.
20. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE
1990).
21. Id. at 1996.

OF

PEDIATRICS 1995 (Frank A. Oski et al., eds.,

22.Id.
23. Singer et at., supra note 12, at. 391.
24. Id. at 391-92.
25. Ira J. Chasnoff, Newborn Infants With Drug Withdrawal Symptoms, 9 PEDIATRICS IN REv. 273, 275 (1988).
26. WISSOW, supra note 16, at 186.

27.Id.
28. Singer et al., supra note 12, at 394.

29. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1991: Hearings on
P.L. 102-119 Before the Select Subcomm. on Educ. of the House Comm. on
Educ. and Labor, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1991) (statement of Dan R.
Griffith, Ph.D, National Association for Prenatal Addiction and Research
(NAPRE».
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type of rehabilitative or remedial services to make any progress at
all. 30 Additionally, the research suggests that early intervention is
necessary.31 Without early intervention, it is conceivable that many
of these children would suffer more serious long term consequences.
In addition to medical intervention, many drug-exposed infants
require special education later on in life to address developmental,
learning, emotional and behavioral problems resulting from their
drug exposure in utero. 32 In 1975, Congress enacted Public Law 94142, known as the "Education for All Handicapped Children Act,"33
which is currently referred to as the "Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act. "34 The Act mandates that all children receive free
public education appropriate to meet their particular learning needs,
regardless of their handicapping or disabling conditions. 3s The Act
defines "children with disabilities" as those suffering from mental
retardation, serious emotional disturbances, and specific learning
disabilities, among other things,36 and those "who, by reason thereof
need special education and related services."37 Clearly, this definition
encompasses children suffering from the mental retardation and
cognitive disturbance effects of drug exposure in utero.
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act makes the provision of special education to these and other disabled children a
requirement, not a luxury. Thus, the fiscal responsibility to provide
the services is inherent, whether the cost is small or large, as it
undoubtedly will be if more children require special services. 38 For
example, during the 1990-1991 school year, the State of Maryland

30. [d.
31. [d.
32. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 34. Some clinical reports indicate that cocaineexposed children exhibit patterns of behavioral problems similar to those seen
in emotionally disturbed children. Singer et al., supra note 12, at 402.
33. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89
Stat. 773 (1975).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a) (1988 & Supp. II 1990), amended by Pub. L. 101-476
(1990) (amended to affect terminology change).
35. [d. § 1400(c).
36. [d. § 1401(a)(1)(A). Children with specific learning disabilities are further
defined as
[c]hildren who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using language,
spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect
ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical
calculations. Such disorders include such conditions as perceptual
disabilities, brain injury, minimal brain dysfunction, dyslexia, and
developmental aphasia.
[d. § 1401(a)(15).
37. [d. § 1401(a)(1)(B).
38. See GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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had a total of 88,024 children from the ages of three to twenty-one
participating in some type of special. education,39 at a cost in excess
of 406.5 million dollars.40 Because children receiving special education
are categorized by their handicapping condition, rather than by its
cause,41 it is impossible to tell how many children are educationally
disabled as a result of prenatal drug exposure. However, many of
the handicapping conditions identified are those associated with fetal
exposure to drugs and/or alcoho1. 42
The federal law authorizes the appropriation of federal funds to
assist the states in educating children with special needs. 43 The total
amount that a state spends is augmented by federal money pursuant
to a percentage scheme. 44 A finite amount of money, however, can
go only so far. Significant increases in the number of children
receiving special educational services will unduly burden an already
costly system. As more students require special education, this finite
amount of money must be more broadly disbursed.
Compounding the problem is the fact that substance abuse is
strongly associated with other health and social risks.4s In addition
to requiring a greater amount and costlier measure of educational
and medical care,46 those children and their families who reside in
homes where drug use and abuse is present are more likely to become
the needy recipients of social service assistance programs. 47 Nationwide, the demand for foster care placements rose 29% from 1986 to
1989: Much of this increase was attributable to substance abuse in
general. 48
The likelihood of an individual having criminal involvement with
the legal system seems greater when drug abuse is dominant in family
life. Crack cocaine, in particular, is associated with increases in
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.

MARYLAND STATE DEP'T OF EDUC., THE FACT BOOK 28 (1992).
[d. at 21.
[d. at 30.
[d. (discussing specifically mental retardation, emotional disturbance and specific learning disabilities as handicapping conditions).
20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
[d. § 1411.
WISSOW, supra note 16, at 186.
GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 6. Hospitals surveyed for the GAO REPORT
indicated that hospital charges for drug-exposed infants were at least four times
higher than charges for non-exposed infants. [d.
.
[d. at 30. In cities that require the reporting of drug-exposed infants to child
welfare authorities, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of such
reports from 1986 to 1989. In New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, these
reports increased by 268070, 342%, and 1735%, respectively. [d.
[d. at 33. The increase in foster care placements for children under two years
of age rose even more dramatically. For example, in Illinois the number of
infants in foster care who were younger than one year old increased by 284%
from 1985 to 1989. [d.
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interpersonal violence and increases in the proportion of fatal child
abuse and neglect cases associated with drug use. 49 Although the
number of arrests for the sale and possession of illegal drugs in
Maryland declined somewhat during 1989-1991,50 possession and sales
account for only a small portion of drug-related activity. 51 Other
drug-related crimes include those committed under the influence of
drugs, those committed to obtain money to buy drugs, and those
associated with drug distribution. 52
In general, the use of secondary drugs such as alcohol, marijuana
and cigarettes is common among those who abuse other drugs. 53 This
secondary drug use phenomenon further complicates the evaluation
of the infant exposed in utero to narcotics or cocaine. 54 Alcohol
intoxication is highly correlated with criminal behavior: More than
half of all murderers and their victims are believed to have been
intoxicated at the time of the murder. 55 Additionally, the percentage
of women who are assessed for driving while intoxicated has increased. 56
III.

LEGAL ISSUES

While the need to control prenatal substance abuse is obvious,
a dilemma arises concerning the reconciliation of maternal and fetal
rights. Although there are no reported Maryland cases specifically
addressing the issue of fetal abuse due to maternal drug use, a
number of other states have decided the legal rights of the unborn
in such a situation. Some of these states have criminally prosecuted

49. WISSOW, supra note 16, at 187.
50. MARYLAND ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE ADMIN., TRENDS AND PATTERNS IN
ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE IN MARYLAND 96 (1991) [hereinafter TRENDS AND
PATTERNS].
51. Id. at 105.

52.Id.
53. Chasnoff, Parameters, supra note 15, at 1408.
54. WISSOW, supra note 16, at 186. In addition to the problems created by known
drugs, street drugs may be adulterated with other substances, such as phencyclidine, chalk, sugar, or talc, that may have untoward effects on the fetus.

Id.
55. THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 128 (3d ed. rev. 1987).
56. TRENDS AND PATTERNS, supra note 50, at 83. Driving while intoxicated (DWI)
assessments are conducted as soon as possible after an individual has been
charged with a drinking and driving offense. Referrals for assessment are
usually generated through the courts. The purpose of the assessments is to
determine both the severity of the drinking problem and the most appropriate
rehabilitative service for the offender. Id. at 79.
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mothers under existing child abuse or drug-related statutes.S7 Other
states have considered the use of civil commitment penalties S8 or tort
liability. S9 A threshold issue in decision-making arises in all cases
because state intervention in pregnancy poses problems of constitutional dimensions.

A.

Constitutional Considerations

The constraints to governmental intervention in a woman's decisions about her pregnancy emanate from the interest in protecting
her privacy rights. Since Griswold v. Connecticut,60 where the Supreme Court held that the right of a married couple to use contraceptives fell within a general right of privacy, 61 women have been
entitled to certain freedoms regarding the management of their reproductive interests. Following the Griswold decision, the Court in
Eisenstadt v. BaircJ62 soundly endorsed the privacy right in procreative
interests when it extended the right to contraception to unmarried
individuals. The Court firmly stated that "[i]f the right of privacy
means anYthing, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into rriatters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child. "63
Under Roe v. Wade,64 the right of women to control their
pregnancy was firmly established. The Supreme Court made clear in
Roe that, within certain parameters, it is within a woman's fundamental right of privacy to make decisions affecting her own pregnancy. The Court, however, limited that right based upon the state's
compelling interest in maternal health during the second trimester,
and in the potential life of a viable fetus. 6s The Roe decision held
that a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy until the second

57. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Johnson
v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d 1140 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991); People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio
1992).
58. Troy D. v. Kelly D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); In re Baby X,
293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558
N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Misc.
2d 1986).
59. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
60. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61. Id. at 485-86.
62. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
63. Id. at 453.
64. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
65. Id. at 150.
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trimester virtually precludes any state intervention prior to this time. 66
If early prenatal drug abuse constituted actionable behavior, the
"rather absurd result would be that endangering a fetus [would be]
more severely punished than aborting it.' '67
Under the standards set forth in Roe, a fetus is not a "person"
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis. 68 Once a fetus is viable, however, the state has a compelling
interest in its protection. 69 The Court based its decision on a "trimester framework" to determine that crucial time. 70 The third trimester in a pregnancy signaled a point when the state's interest was
activated because that was deemed about the time when a fetus has
the capability of "meaningful life outside the mother's womb. "71 At
viability, the fetus may indeed have some limited legal status. The
Roe decision may be interpreted as holding that, although it is clear
that prenatal substance abuse may cause fetal harm long before
viability,72 the problem may not be considered a state problem until
that point of viability.73 Under Roe, any legal recourse that might
be available to the viable fetus would be absent for the nonviable
fetus.
The parameters set forth in Roe, however, are currently not as
clear. In 1989 the Supreme Court, in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,74 expanded the constitutionally permissible scope of state
regulation of reproduction. While the Court did not explicitly overrule
the abortion right in Roe, it refused to strike down the preamble to
a Missouri statute which states that life begins at conception and
that the unborn have some protectable interests. 7s The Court further
set the stage for dismantling the trimester framework by stating that
it "[does] not see why the State's interest in protecting potential
human life should come into existence only at the point of viability,
and that there should therefore be a rigid line allowing state regulation
after viability but prohibiting it before viability. "76

66. [d. at 163.

67. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 914 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
68. 410 U.S. at 158.
69. [d. at 163.
70. [d. at 164-65.
71. [d. at 163.
72. Ira J. Chasnoff et aI., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine Use in Pregnancy, 261
JAMA 1741, 1744 (1989). The author states that "[ilt appears ... that cocaine
exposure in only the first trimester does place the newborn at risk for neurobehavioral deficiencies compared with drug-free infants." [d.
73. 410 U.S. at 163.
74. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
75. [d. at 506-07.
76. [d. at 519.
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The conflict between maternal and fetal rights pits the woman's
constitutional fundamental "right(s) to religious free exercise, physical autonomy, and privacy [against] the fetus' right to freedom from
physical harm.' '77 State intervention in areas of fundamental rights
requires 'a compelling state interest, and any restrictive action undertaken by the state must be narrowly tailored to meet that interest. 78
Those advocating state intervention argue that there is no fundamental right to illegal drug use. 79 These advocates further argue that the
fetus "has a protectable legal right to be free from harm resulting
from maternal conduct. "80 These arguments are premised upon the
theory that a woman's right. of privacy related to her pregnancy
extends only to her decision to have an abortion within the given
parameters: Once she has decided to carry her pregnancy to term,
the state has a compelling interest in the health of the fetus. 81 One
obstacle to state intervention aimed at protecting the fetus from harm
lies in reconciling the language· of statutes. In order for advocates to
successfully urge state intervention, the language of the statutes must
be interpreted so as to include the fetus within their scope. A number
of courts have grappled with this statutory obstacle.
1993]

B.

State Treatment oj Prenatal Substance Abuse

1.

Criminal Liability of the Mother
In Reyes v. Superior Court,82 a pregnant heroin addict was
warned by a public health nurse about the dangers of drug use in
pregnancy and the problems associated with the failure to seek
prenatal medical care. 83 Despite this warning, the woman continued
77. Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State Regulation of
Pregnancy, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1325, 1331 (1990) [hereinafter Rethinking
Motherhood] .
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
79. State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992) (Wright, J., dissenting). The dissent
quotes the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association as amicus as follows:
[I]n the case at bar, the use of the test set out in Roe v. Wade and
its prodigy [sic] to balance the privacy rights of a woman against the
compelling interest the State possesses in the life and well-being of
the unborn child is inappropriate. For here, we are not dealing with
a fundamental right. There is no fundamental right to abuse cocaine.
The act of using cocaine is not an act relating to a right connected
with marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, or child
bearing. • • • No special protection is afforded the cocaine abuser
just because she is pregnant.
[d. at 714 (second alteration in original) (omissions in original).
80. Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 77, at 1331.
81. See id. at 1331-32 for a general discussion of the arguments for state regulation.
82. 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
83. [d. at 912-13.
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to use drugs and to abstain from receiving prenatal care.84 When the
woman later gave birth to twin boys who were addicted to heroin
and suffering from withdrawal, felony child endangerment charges
were filed against her. 85 The Court of Appeal of California held that
the statute was not intended to apply to prenatal conduct. 86 The
court stated that if "the Legislature determines to confer legal
personality on unborn fetuses for certain limited purposes, it expresses
that intent in specific and appropriate terms. "87 The court further
noted the mandate to strictly construe penal statutes in favor of the
defendant. 88
Shortly 'after the Reyes decision, the Court of Appeals of Michigan reached a seemingly different conclusion. The court in In re
Baby XS9 held that a newborn suffering from narcotics withdrawal
because of prenatal matenial drug addiction may properly be considered a neglected child. 90 The real difference between these two cases
is the type of proceeding that was brought. In Reyes, the mother
was prosecuted under a felony criminal statute. 91 In contrast, Baby
X involved a civil neglect suit92-a distinctly different type of proceeding where the aim is to protect rather than punish. Like the
Reyes court, the Baby X court declined to give "wholesale recognition
of fetuses as persons."93 However, the Baby X court adopted a
limited recognition of the rights of the child in utero when it is in
the child's best interest: The court opined that "since a child has
legal right to begin life with a sound mind and body, it is within

84. Id. at 913.
85.Id.
86.Id.
87. Id. at 914.
88.Id.
89. 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
90. Id. at 739.
91. Reyes, 141 Cal. Rptr. at 913. Reyes was charged with two counts of felony
child endangering in violation of Cal. Penal Code § 273a(1), which at the time
read in part:
"Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce
great bodily harm or death, . . . having the care or custody of any
child, ... willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such
situation that its person or health is endangered, is punishable by
imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding 1 year, or in the state
prison for not less than 1 year nor more than 10 years."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)(I».
92. Baby X, 293 N. W .2d. at 736. A petition was filed against Mother X in the
Oakland County Probate Court alleging that she had "so neglected her child
that the court should assert jurisdiction." Id. at 738. The probate court is a
court given jurisdiction over such juvenile matters under MICH. COMPo LAWS
ANN. § 712A.2 and MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178(598.2). [d.
93. Id.
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this best interest to examine all prenatal conduct bearing on that
right."94 The court further stated that "[s]ince prior treatment of
one child can support neglect allegations regarding another child,
... prenatal treatment can be considered probative of a child's
neglect as well."9s
Other courts have taken similar positions, reflecting the differences in a punitive versus protective approach to this dilemma. In
another California case, Troy D. v. Kelly D. :~<> because an infant
was born under the influence of drugs, the juvenile court's jurisdiction was considered sufficient. 97 While the Court of Appeal of
California only cursorily noted the Reyes decision, it lent credibility
to the idea that "[a] fetus is accorded variable legal treatment due
to social policies underlying different areas of the law. For example,
an unborn fetus is not considered to be a child within California's
felony child abuse statute .... "98 Nonetheless, the court cited Baby
X with approval in deciding that prenatal use of dangerous drugs by
a mother is probative of future child neglect. 99 The Family Court of
New York has established similar standards.lOo
In keeping with this trend, in People v. Hardy,JOI the Court of
Appeals of Michigan held that a woman could not be criminally
prosecuted for either child abuse or delivery of cocaine to her baby
via the umbilical cord. I02 While the court made no mention of the
Baby X case and its civil rationale for fetal rights, it did identify
problems associated with applying a criminal law to a situation of
this nature. In Hardy, a mother was charged with child abuse
following allegations that she ingested cocaine while pregnant, thereby
causing serious physical harm to her infant.lo3 The mother was also
94. Id. at 739 (citations omitted).
95.Id.
96. 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
97. Id. at 874.
98. Id. at 873.
99. Id. at 874. The court pointed out that "[w]hile jurisdiction must be asserted
on the basis of conditions which exist at the time of the jurisdictional hearing,
the court is not required to disregard the mother's prior conduct." Id.
100. In re Fathima Ashanti K.J., 558 N.Y.S.2d 447 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1990). In this
case, where the father was also a respondent, the court recognized that the
mother's drug use was responsible for the newborn's positive urine toXicology
screen at birth. Id. at 447. However, the court also placed blame upon the
father for dissuading the mother from participating in a drug treatment
program. Id. Additionally, the court heard the father's arguments 1) that he
did not pass cocaine to the fetus; and 2) that he never had care of the child.
Id. at 448. The court identified the child's condition at birth as the precipitating
event warranting judicial intervention, and based jurisdiction on the potential
danger to the child. Id. at 449.
101. 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991).
102. Id. at 52-53.
103. Id. at 51.
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charged with the delivery of cocaine to the infant, because at the
baby's birth, when the umbilical cord was still attached to both
mother and baby, cocaine was being delivered from the mother to
her child. 104 The court again highlighted the mandate to strictly
construe penal statutes, and determined that the legislature did not
intend for this statute to cover the offense charged.lOs Additionally,
the court emphasized that a criminal statute must be sufficiently
.definite and expliCit to put an individual on notice as to what behavior
might be proscribed. 106
This reluctance to broaden the scope of criminal statutes has
been echoed in other jurisdictions. In State v. Gray,l07 the Supreme
Court of Ohio declined to sustain the child endangerment conviction
of a mother who had allegedly ingested cocaine during the third
trimester of her pregnancy, thereby causing serious physical harm,
cocaine withdrawal, to her infant. los The court again called attention
to the need to strictly construe criminal statutes against the State and
liberally construe them in favor of the accused. 109 In addition, the
court refused to broadly read the word "child" in the statute to
encompass a fetus when the legislature had declined to adopt such a
broad interpretation yo Furthermore, the court pointed out that the
legislature was indeed undertaking an investigation of prenatal neglect. 1II
In a compelling dissent, Judge Wright insisted that the "[l]aws
of Ohio do protect the unborn child who is subsequently born
alive."112 His dissent observed that the Ohio courts have determined
that a viable fetus is a "child" for purposes of the child abuse
statute, and that a cause of action exists when a viable fetus is
negligently injured in utero and is subsequently stillborn.1I3 Addi104. Id. at 51-52.
105. Id. at 52-53.
106. Id. at 52.

107. 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1991).
108. Id. at 710.
109. Id. at 711.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 712-13. At the time of this decision, the Ohio legislature had a pending
bill which, if passed, would create a new crime of prenatal child neglect in an
effort to address the issue of prenatal substance abuse and subsequent fetus/
infant exposure. Id. at 712.
112. Id. at 714 n.5 (Wright, J., dissenting).
113. Id. Judge Wright's dissent cited In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio Misc. 2d
1986), for the proposition that a viable fetus is a "child" for purposes of the
child abuse statute. Gray, 500 N.E.2d at 714. His dissent appeared to overlook
that the Ruiz court was construing a civil child abuse statute rather than a
criminal child abuse statute. The Ruiz court specifically distinguished between
civil and criminal child abuse statutes:
Such a holding does not conflict with the . . . general principle that
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tionally, his dissent cited with approval the brief of the Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association as amicus:
A pregnant woman is not, due to her maternity, immune
from the consequences of her illegal acts. This case is not
about a woman's choice to conceive or carry a child. This
is about the right of a child to be born healthy, free of
injuries inflicted by the illegal acts of another .114
The dissent, however, apparently failed to consider the distinction between the civil and criminal approaches to the problem-a
distinction recognized by other courts. In addition, the dissent also
neglected to address whether recourse is available to a drug-exposed
nonviable fetus that is subsequently born with defects resulting from
that exposure.
Florida courts have also declined to allow convictions of substance abusing mothers. liS As in the other criminal prosecution cases,
the courts cite legislative intent for their justification. 1I6 Moreover,
in Johnson v. State ,117 the Supreme Court of Florida indicated that
it understood the relevant statutes to address the problem of drug
dependent mothers and newborns as a public health problem rather
than as a criminal problem. lls In Johnson, a case similar to People

114.
115.
116.

117.
118..

criminal statutes must be construed strictly. [The child abuse statute]
is not a criminal statute. And the child endangerment provision
specifies that there need not be a conviction under [the statute] in
order to find that a child is abused.
Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d at 938.
Gray, 584 N.E.2d at 714.
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, (Fla. 1992); State v. Gethers, 585 So. 2d
1140 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
In Gethers, the District Court of Appeal of Florida quoted with approval the
following portion of Judge Sharp's dissent in Johnson:
"From this legislative history, it is clear that the Legislature considered
and rejected a specific statutory provision authorizing criminal penalties against mothers for delivering drug-affected children who received transfer of an illegal drug derivative metabolized by the mother's
body, in utero. In light of this express legislative statement, I conclude
that the Legislature never intended for the general drug delivery statute
to authorize prosecutions . . . ."
Gethers, 585 So. 2d at 1142 (quoting Johnson, 578 So. 2d at 422-23 (Sharp,
J., dissenting».
Judge Sharp's analysis was also adopted by the Florida Supreme Court,
which reversed the district court of appeal's decision in Johnson. Johnson v.
State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992), rev'g 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1991).
602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
[d. at 1293. The court again adopted the language of the lower court's dissent:
"[T]he legislature expressly chose to treat the problem of drug dependent
mothers and newborns as a public health problem and that it considered but
rejected imposing criminal sanctions via section 893.13(1)(c)(l)." [d.
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v. Hardy,119 a woman was charged with delivery of a controlled
dangerous substance to her newborn infant during the thirty to ninety
seconds following the infant's birth, but before the umbilical cord
was CUt. 110 In refusing to uphold a lower court conviction, the court
opined that prosecuting mothers for drug use and "delivery" to their
newborns may be the least effective means of addressing prenatal
drug abuse. 121 The court contended that the fear of prosecution may
have the effect of increasing the incidence of abortion, causing
substance-abusing pregnant women to avoid prenatal care, or causing
reluctance in health care workers to identify substance abusers.122
Anyone of these negative effects, resulting from the fear of prosecution, would certainly undermine compelling state interests in preventing harm to the child or the mother.
2.

Tort Liability of the Mother
One commentator has suggested that "criminalization fails to
strike at the heart of the issue. Because criminalization does not
attempt to cure the addictions which cause fetal harm, it fails to
protect the fetuses from the dangers of gestational substance abuse. " I23
In addition to the described civil and criminal treatments of the fetal
abuse problem, state intervention to prevent such abuse has been
analyzed under a maternal duty of care theory.l24 While a fundamental right to privacy protects a woman's right to an abortion
within certain limits, no similar protection of the right to abuse
harmful substances exists. Therefore, under a duty of care theory,
once a woman has decided to carry her pregnancy to term she
assumes the duty to use reasonable care in ensuring the safety of the
fetus. 12s Although it is a universal principle that a child may have a
cause of action against a third party for injuries sustained in utero, 126
parent-child immunity doctrines prevail in many jurisdictions, and
may prevent a negligence claim by the drug-exposed child. 127
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

124.
125.
126.
127.

469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991).
[d. at 1290-91.
[d. at 1295-96.
[d.
Kristen R. Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtful
Legislative Response, 65 WASH. L. REv. 377, 393 (1990).
See id. at 383-84 (discussing Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill.
1988); Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980».
[d. at 388-89.
E.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEATON ON TORTS § 55 (5th ed.
1984).
See; e.g., Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990) (holding that
parent-child immunity doctrines apply to wrongful death and survival actions);
Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986) (refusing to abrogate parentchild immunity doctrines).
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In Grodin v. Grodin,.28 however, the Court of Appeals of
Michigan upheld the ability of a child to maintain a negligence suit
against his mother for the injury he sustained from his mother's use
of tetracycline during her pregnancy.129 Even though the actual injury,
discolored teeth, was not manifested until some time after the mother
took the drug, the court held that "the litigating child's mother
would bear the same liability for injurious, negligent conduct as
would a third person."130 In so holding, the court applied the
principles of Plumley v. Klein,131 which abrogated intra-family tort
immunity. 132
The danger with an approach allowing the child to sue the
mother in negligence for prenatal injuries lies in its tendency to place
the mother in the position of the guarantor of the health of the
fetus. 133 The ramifications of such a maternal responsibility are
enormous. Imposing such a duty on the mother may not only create
an adversarial relationship between mother and fetus, but also may
effectively handcuff the mother from undertaking any activity that
may have a potentially adverse effect on the child. Any realistic
remedy for this type of tort action would be difficult to identify,
and even more difficult to enforce.
In contrast, Stallman v. Youngquist l34 did not involve the use
of illegal, or even prescription drugs by a pregnant woman. The
Supreme Court of Illinois, in Stallman, took a definitive stand on
the issue of tort actions between mother and fetus. The court
addressed whether a pregnant woman should be liable to her unborn
child for negligent driving. us The court held that for purposes of
tort liability, any recognition of a legal duty from mother to fetus
must emanate from the legislature. 136 The court criticized Grodin for
creating a legal fiction by "[treating] a pregnant woman as a stranger
1993]

128. 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
129. Id. at 869-70.
130. Id. at 870.
131. 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972).
132. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d at 870. The court remanded the case to determine whether
the mother, in her decision to continue using the drug during pregnancy, had
used a "reasonable exercise of parental discretion." Id. at 871. The court
emphasized that any intra-family tort immunity was abrogated, except where
1) the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority
over the child; and 2) the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of reasonable
parental discretion with respect to the provisions of food, clothing, housing,
medical and denfal services and other care. Id. at 870.
133. Lichtenberg, supra note 123, at 389.
134. 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
135. Id. at 355-56.
136. Id. at 361.
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to her developing fetus for purposes of tort liability." 137 The court
pointedly questioned as follows:
By what judicially defined standard would a mother have
her every act or omission while pregnant subjected to State
scrutiny? By what objective standard could a jury be guided
in determining whether a pregnant woman did all that was
necessary in order not to breach a legal duty to not interfere
with her fetus' separate and independent right to be born
whole? In what way would prejudicial and stereotypical
beliefs about the reproductive abilities of women be kept
from interfering with a jury's determination of whether a
particular woman was negligent at any point during her
pregnancy? 138

3.

State and Federal Statutory Responses

In response to maternal liability for prenatal substance abuse, a
number of states have attempted to enact or modify laws that
specifically address substance-related injury to the fetus. Aligned with
related case law, prenatal substance abuse laws have been incorporated into statutes geared toward child protection or rehabilitation:
No state has yet enacted criminal law.s specific to this purpose. 139
Several states have identified children born with fetal alcohol
syndrome or drug withdrawal symptoms as falling within the purview
of child neglect statutes. In some of these states, a medical diagnosis
of fetal alcohol syndrome or drug withdrawal symptoms at birth is
prima facie evidence of neglect. l40 In other states, similar statutes
require a reporting of prenatal substance abuse situations, triggering
investigation but not necessarily a finding of neglect. 141
Other states have approached prenatal substance abuse differently. Colorado requires that pregnan~ women who receive medical
assistance benefits be assessed for the risk of a poor birth outcome
due to substance abuse; where the risk is high, special assistance may
be provided to reduce such risk.142

137.
138.
139.
140.

[d. at 358.
[d. at 360.
Rethinking Motherhood, supra note 77, at 1329.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-18(2)(c)-(d) (Smith-Hurd 1990); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-6-4-3.1(1) (Burns 1987 & Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 432B.330.1(b) (Michie 1991).
141. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 51A (West 1969 & Supp. 1993); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 62A-4-504, 62A-4-509(1) (1989).
142. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 26-4-508.2(1) (West Supp. 1992).
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A number of other states tap into existing laws related to alcohol
and drug abuse prevention,143 or health generally, 144 where provisions
specifically target drug use in pregnancy as an area properly addressed
through education and intervention. Statutory provisions of this
nature provide for the establishment of screening, educational and
treatment services for pregnant substance abusers and their children.
One such statute in Wisconsin mandates the allocation of funds to
provide these services within local public health agencies. 14s These
laws are valuable because they directly address the problem without
affixing blame or discouraging prenatal care.
Although no specifically relevant federal legislation exists, Congress has indicated an interest in the problem through proposed
legislation to establish a program of grants for children exposed
petinatally to drugs. l46 Through the Senate Committee on Finance, .
the federal government has also· requested a special report on the
subject from the General Accounting Office. 147 Existing federal legislation related to the issues of child abuse/neglectl48 and drug/alcohol
abu~el49 only peripherally address the problem. None of this federal
legislation, however, specifically addresses drug-exposed infants.
IV. MARYLAND'S TREATMENT OF PRENATAL
SUBSTANCE ABUSE
Once born, an infant in Maryland is safeguarded by laws seeking
to protect "children who have been the subject of abuse or neglect. "ISO Maryland also has enacted criminal laws prohibiting child
abuse,1SI the furnishing of alcohol to minors,JS2 the possessionls3 and
143. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-644(a) (West 1992); Omo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3793.15 (Baldwin 1993); OR. REv. STAT. § 430.955 (1991).
144. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 146.183 (West Supp. 1992).
145. [d. The statute allocates $250,000 in each of fiscal years 1989-90 and 1990-91.
However, the grant is apparently time limited, as the statute specifically states
that "[t]his section does not apply after June 30, 1993." [d. § 146.183(2).
146. H.R. 3832, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). One purpose of this bill was to
amend the "Individuals with Disabilities Education Act," 20 U.S.C. § 1400
(1988 & Supp. II 1990), to identify drug-exposed children as a discrete group
falling under the purview of the Act, thus requiring grant funding to address
the issue. [d. § 1400(c). The bill was sent to various committees and apparently
never resurfaced.
147. GAO REpORT, supra note 3, at 1.
148. 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment and Adoption Reform Act sets guidelines for the nianagement of
these matters.
149. [d.
150. MD. CODE ANN .• PAM. LAW § 5-702 (1991).
151. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 35A (1992).
152. [d. § 401A. However, § 401A(b) provides an exception if alcohol is provided
by an immediate family member and consumed in a private residence. [d. §
401A(b).
153. [d. § 286 (1992 & Supp. 1993).
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distribution of controlled dangerous substances,154 and the battering
of family members. 155 Currently, no counterpart statutory provisions
specifically address the interests of the unborn. Maryland law clearly
identifies a child as "any individual under the age of eighteen
years."156 Consequently, what may not be administered to an infant
who has just emerged from the womb may apparently be freely
administered to a fetus with impunity. Although the devastating
effects of fetal abuse are well-documented,157 Maryland has yet to
adopt any legal provisions to protect the fetus from such abuse when
it is caused by the mother.
Notably, Maryland courts have identified some legal rights for
the unborn when injury or death results from the behavior of a third
party. The Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed injury
inflicted to a fetus in Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch,158 where an infant
born prematurely suffered injuries resulting in blindness after an
automobile accident in which the infant's pregnant mother was a
passenger. 159 In a scholarly opinion, the court presented an exhaustive
historical accounting of the law as it relates to the unborn. 16O Absent
any applicable statutes, the court's holding reflected its understanding
of the common law as it should be applied in Maryland. 161 Utilizing
this common law application, the court held that the infant was
entitled to recover against the defendant drivers for injuries sustained
in utero. 162
The court of appeals reached a similar conclusion in Odham v.
Sherman,163 where a full-term viable fetus was delivered stillborn
following the mother's involvement in an automobile accident caused
by the defendant's negligence. l64 While the court viewed Gorsuch as
controlling for the proposition that a viable child born dead is a

154. [d. § 287 (1992).

155. MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW §§ 4-504 to 509 (1991 & Supp. 1993). These
sections do not actually prohibit domestic violence as a criminal activity; more
precisely, they serve to identify the available recourse to a victim of domestic
violence, and authorize the court, upon clear and convincing evidence of abuse,
to issue protective orders. Section 4-508 provides for the protective order to
be backed by punitive sanctions for violations. Section 4-509 provides for
penalties for failure to comply with court orders.
156. [d. § 5·701(d).
157. See supra notes 16-31 and accompanying text.
158. 197 Md. 417, 79 A.2d 550 (1951).
159. [d. at 418-19, 79 A.2d at 550.
160. [d. at 419-37, 79 A.2d at 550-59.
161. See MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 5(a) (Supp. 1993) (stating in part that "the
Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the Common Law of England").
162. Gorsuch, 197 Md. at 440-41, 79 A.2d at 560-61.
163. 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964).
164. [d. at 182, 198 A.2d at 72.
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"person" for purposes of Lord Campbell's Act,.6S it acknowledged
that Gorsuch dealt with an infant born alive. l66 Nonetheless, the'
court did not think that the language of Gorsuch was "intended to
impose a limitation or condition of birth. "167 Therefore, the Odham
court limited its holding to infants viable at the time of the wrong,
stating that "[w]e think the weight of present authority draws the
line at least at a point where the common law concept of viability
is in effect." 168
Maryland courts did not confront the issue of a nonviable fetus
until almost twenty years later. In Group Health Ass'n v. Blumenthal,l69 the court of appeals made it clear that viability at the time
of injury is not required to uphold an infant's cause of action if the
infant is born alive. 170 In Blumenthal, an infant born alive subsequently died because of an obstetrician's negligence in failing to
address the mother's problem of an incompetent cervix early in her
pregnancy.171 Because the doctor had failed to perform the necessary
minor surgery during the early months of pregnancy, the infant was
born premature and was unable to survive.172 The court upheld the
. wrongful death action, notwithstanding that the actual injury occurred during a period of fetal nonviability.113
More recently, Maryland courts' have determined the status of a
fetus in a criminal context. In Williams v. State,174 a defendant's
homicide conviction was upheld when an infant born alive died soon
thereafter from injuries received in utero when the defendant shot
165. [d. at 183, 198 A.2d at 72. At that time Lord Campbell's Act was codified as
MD. CODE ANN. art. 67, §§ 1, 4 (1957) and stated the following:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act,
neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if
death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an
action and recover damages in respect thereof, the . . . person who
would have been liable if death had not ensued ... shall be liable to
an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured.
[d. at 181, 198 A.2d at 71 (omissions in original).
166. [d. at 183, 198 A.2d 72-73.
167. [d. at 184, 198 A.2d at 73.
168. [d. at 185, 198 A.2d at 73. The common law understanding of viability referred
to "quickening," the time when a mother first begins to feel fetal movement.
See Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417, 420, 79 A.2d 550, 550-51 (1951).
169. 295 Md. 104, 453 A.2d 1198 (1983).
170. [d. at 116, 453 A.2d at 1206.
171. [d. at 107, 453 A.2d at 1201. An incompetent cervix is defective in its
musculature and thus is prone to dilation too early in the pregnancy: Without
corrective surgery, the condition will result in premature delivery of the fetus.
[d. n.2.
172. [d. at 108, 453 A.2d at 1201.
173. [d. at 118-19, 453 A.2d at 1206-07.
174. 316 Md. 677; 561 A.2d 216 (1989).
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the mother with a bow and arrow.17S The infant in utero was
necessarily deemed a "person" for purposes of the homicide conviction. Although the infant in Williams had reached the point of
viability,176 the question remains whether the same result would have
occurred had the fetus been nonviable.
As these cases make clear, a third party is liable to a viable
fetus for injuries caused by that party, regardless of the infant's
status upon emerging from the womb. However, liability does not
result when the third party is a parent of that fetus/infant. Since
1930, Maryland has subscribed to the parent':child immunity doctrine
elucidated in Schneider v. Schneider,177 where the court held that a
mother could not sue her minor child for injuries received as a result
of the child's negligent driving.178 In reaching its decision, the court
utilized the reasoning of other jurisdictions which have held that a
child could not sue his parent. 179 The Schneider court, therefore,
applied the parent-child immunity against both the parent and the
child seeking to bring suit and, as a result, has clearly established
the policy in Maryland.
Since Schneider, Maryland has steadfastly refused to abrogate
the parent-child immunity doctrine as applied to minor children. ISO
In Frye v. Frye,1sl the court of appeals discussed the policy reasons
for the maintenance of the parent-child immunity doctrine in the
past, declaring the following:
[T]his Court has had an abiding belief that the parent-child
immunity rule enhances the public policy in that it sub serves
the repose of families and the best interests of society by
preserving the peace and harmony of society and of the
families composing society. Therefore, the inquiry how turns

175. [d. at 679, 561 A.2d at 217.
176. The mother was nine months pregnant at the time of the shooting. [d. at 679,
561 A.2d at 217.
177. 160 Md. 18, 152 A. 498 (1930).
178. [d. at 19, 152 A. at 498.
179. [d. at 22, 152 A. at 499.
180. See Smith v. Gross, 319 Md. 138, 571 A.2d 1219 (1990) (applying parent~child
immunity to children born out of wedlock); Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505
A.2d 826 (1986) (applying parent-child immunity to son suing father for injuries
sustained in automobile accident); Yost v. Yost, 172 Md. 128, 190 A. 753
(1937) (applying parent-child immul}ity to divorced parent living apart from
child); Sanford v. Sanford, 15 Md. App. 390, 290 A.2d 812 (1972) (applying
parent-child immunity to child suing father for personal injuries arising out of
automobile accident); Latz v. Latz, 10 Md. App. 720, 272 A.2d 435 (holding
that parent-child immunity is constitutional and does not violate equal protection guarantees), cert. denied, 261 Md. 726 (1971).
181. 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986).
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to the validity of that belief under present day mores and
in light of the current status of the law .... 182
The court maintained that the preservation of parental authority and
family unity was a policy as strongly held today as in the past, and
that "[i]t is clear that today's parent-child relationship, as recognized
by this Court and the legislature, furnishes no compelling reason to
abrogate the rule. "183 Thus, until this doctrine is either overturned
by the courts or abrogated by statute, parent-child immunity remains
the rule in Maryland, and thus precludes any action by or on behalf
of an infant for damages arising from fetal abuse.
The absence of Maryland statutes acknowledging the existence
of fetal abuse compounds the problem. Although several attempts
have been made to introduce bills into the legislature which would
amend the existing family law article to include laws related to
prenatal use of controlled dangerous substances and subsequent infant
harm, these bills have failed to gain the requisite approval of both
the House and the Senate. The most recent Bill, which passed in the
Senate but received an unfavorable review in the House Judiciary
Committee, where it subsequently died, has not been substantially
changed from previous bills. 184 The Bill sought to expand the current
statutory definition of neglect as follows:
"Neglect" includes use of a controlled dangerous substance,
as defined under article i7, § 277 of the code, by a woman:
1. resulting in an infant's addiction to or dependence on
a controlled dangerous substance; or
2. resulting in the presence of a controlled dangerous
substance in an infant evidenced by toxicology or other
appropriate tests. 18S
The proposed amendment further identifies that an investigation
shall include what is required in other neglect cases and
(3) [i]f the suspected abuse or neglect of an infant involves
possible use of a controlled dangerous substance, as defined
under article 27, § 277 of the code, by the infant's mother:
(I) a toxicology or other appropriate chemical test of the
infant; and
(II) a report to the appropriate division of the local
Department of Social Services on the mother's use of a
controlled dangerous substance. 186
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

[d. at 552, 505 A.2d at 831.
[d. at 561, 505 A.2d at 836.
S. 660, Reg. Sess. (1992) (originally introduced as S. 657 (1991».
[d.
[d.
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Although the Maryland General Assembly has not passed a
prenatal abuse statute, it has established an Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Administration l87 to "[p]romote, develop, establish, conduct, certify,.
and monitor programs for the prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation related to the misuse of alcohol and drugs; [and] [p]romote
and conduct training and research related to the misuse of alcohol
and drugs." 188 The authority to develop programs which specifically
address the needs of pregnant women clearly lies within the domain
of the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration. 189 However, because
the enabling statute does not identify the different types of programs
to be generated, there is no mandate to address the substance abuse
problems of certain discrete risk groups.
Another attempt to legislate on the subject of prenatal substance
abuse came in 1992 with the introduction of House Bill 1459. 190 The
purpose of this Bill was to require the state Alcohol and Drug Abuse
Administration to establish referral procedures to address the problem
of prenatal substance abuse. 191 The Bill sought to require health care
practitioners to report pregnant women suspected of being chemically
dependent to the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Administration for referral
to treatment services. 192 This Bill also died in committee without ever
being passed in either house. Thus, the Maryland General Assembly
has yet to pass any relevant legislation to address the problem. 193
187. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-201 (1990).
188. /d. § 8-401.
189. See id.

190. H.D. 1459, Reg. Sess. (1992).
191. [d.
192. [d.

193. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, pursuant to §§ 2-104(b), 15103, and 15-105 of the Health-General Article of the Annotated Code of
Maryland, established a case management program designed to
demonstrate the costs and effectiveness of two innovative outreach
strategies for pregnant, Medicaid-eligible substance abusers. Specifically, the demonstration project will compare the effectiveness of case
management and support groups in motivating use of prenatal care
and drug treatment and in improving maternal and infant health.
COMAR 1O.09.31.04B. This demonstration project, however, is only intended
to last for three years, effective September I, 1992, and cover a narrow group
of pregnant women having substance-abuse problems. [d. 10.09.31.02,
10.09.31.04, 10.09.31.13. Only pregnant women meeting the following characteristics are eligible to participate in the program: (1) Women in a "federal
categorically needy eligibility category . . . because the recipient is receiving
Aid to Families with Dependent Children," id. 1O.09.31.02A; (2) Women
electing to participate "before the 28th week of ... pregnancy and ending the
7th month following delivery or termination of pregnancy," id. 1O.09.31.02B;
(3) Women between the ages of 18 and 45, id. 1O.09.31.02C; (4) Women
"diagnosed with illicit psychoactive substance abuse or dependence," id.
1O.09.31.02C; (5) Women residing within various zip codes located in Baltimore
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ANALYSIS

Resolution of the prenatal substance abuse problem will obviously be difficult. In creating appropriate legislation to address this
problem, consideration must be given to a number of factors. While
attempts have been made in other jurisdictions to impose criminal
liability upon the mother,l94 to date, no jurisdiction has upheld a
mother's conviction for passing illicit drugs to her fetus in utero. 19S
The use of a statutory construction analysis, strictly construing
criminal laws,l96 evidences an awareness that criminal laws were not
designed to address public health issues. Furthermore, criminal prosecution following the birth of an exposed infant does nothing to
further the goal of ensuring healthy children. Rather than providing
a vehicle for treatment of substance abuse problems in pregnancy,
the fear of prosecution may .have a chilling effect on a mother's
decision to seek any prenatal care.
Civil commitment proceedings, which identify infant drug exposure as a prima facie case of neglect, would have similar results.
In many cases, a finding of abuse or neglect results in removal of
the child from the home. Removing a child from the home does
nothing to promote the "preservation of parental authority and the
family unity" that the court of appeals held so dear in Frye v.
Frye .197 Additionally, drug or alcohol dependence is not dispositive
of neglectful parenting. In contrast, drug or alcohol dependency does
indicate the need for educational and rehabilitative intervention for
both mother and child. Likewise, other Civil remedies do not provide
a ready solution to the problem of prenatal substance abuse. Given
the status of the parent-child immunity doctrine in Maryland 198 and

194.
195.
196.

197.
198.

City, id. 1O.09.31.02E; and (6) Women "not enrolled in a drug abuse treatment
program at the time of entry into the demonstration project," id. 10.09.31.02F.
Obviously, this type of response by an administrative agency will hardly address
the problem of substance abuse among pregnant women since it is limited both
in duration and scope.
See supra notes 82-121 and accompanying text.
See Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1297 (Fla. 1992).
See, e.g., People v. Hardy, 469 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. Ct. App.), cert. denied,
471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991). The language of Hardy typifies the sentiments
of other jurisdictions regarding the construction of criminal statutes to include
prenatal substance abuse conduct. The Hardy court stated:
We are not persuaded that a pregnant woman's use of cocaine, which
might result in the postpartum transfer of cocaine metabolites ... is
the type of conduct that the Legislature intended to be prosecuted
under the delivery-of-cocaine statute .... This, in our opinion, would
not be a reasonable construction of the statute.
[d. at 53.
305 Md. 542, 561, 505 A.2d 826, 836 (1986).
See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
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in other jurisdictions, it is unlikely that relief will come in the form
of tort liability.
Attempts at legislation have also proved unfruitful, perhaps
because the proposed laws have failed to consider the potential
consequences of both the civil and criminal approaches to the problem. Senate Bill 660 and others like it are flawed for several reasons.
Bills like Senate Bill 660 imp<;>rtantly fail to address prenatal substance
abuse as the real problem-these bills do not mention how drug use
by the "woman" might result in an infant's addiction. Prenatal drug
use is not identified as the culprit. The plain language of bills singling
out the mother pose a potential equal protection problem if a drugusing father is not similarly identified as neglectful. A law solely
applicable to women will not withstand strict scrutiny. 199 Furthermore,
if a drug-exposed infant automatically triggers a neglect report, this
report may have the same chilling effect on pregnant women seeking
prenatal care as would a criminal statute. Practically speaking, opposition to the enactment of legislation addressing prenatal substance
abuse stems from the potentially enormous fiscal responsibility that
would attach to its enforcemenUoo Already overburdened local departments of social service and' protective service units would be
additionally burdened in an effort to accommodate prenatal substance
abuse legislation. 201
House Bill 1459 was another attempt to incorporate some of the
relevant prenatal substance abuse language into existing legislation
related to alcohol and drug abuse prevention and treatment. 202 However, House Bill 1459 is too vague because it does not specify how
the recommended program might be implemented. In contrast, the
Bill is too narrow because it would limit the types of chemical

199. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CONST. art. 46, (1981) ("Equality of rights under

the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.").
200. Telephone interview with Carla Simon, LCSW, Program Specialist, Maryland
Dept. of Human Resources 1n Baltimore, Md. (Oct. 3, 1992).
201. Id.
202. H.D. 1459, Reg. Sess. (1992). The Bill's proposed amendment to MD. CODE
ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 8-402 states that "the Administration shall establish a
referral procedure to link chemically dependent women referred to the Administrator under the provisions of § 1-207 of the Health Occupations article with
an appropriate facility or services for the treatment of drug abuse." Id. The
proposed amendment to the health occupations article reads in pertinent part:
A health care practitioner who is providing health care services to a
pregnant woman and who suspects that the woman is chemically
dependent shall refer that woman to the Administrator of the Alcohol
and Drug Abuse Administration in the Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene for referral to an appropriate facility or services for
the treatment of drug abuse.
Id.
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dependence which trigger action.203 As a result, while a pregnant
cocaine addict may be appropriately referred for assistance under the
statute, a pregnant alcoholic may not be referred. 204
Finally, although the Maryland courts have not grappled with
the problem of prenatal substance abuse, Maryland residents are not
immune to this problem. Estimates indicate that approximately 7440
drug affected newborns were born in Maryland in 1990 at a total
cost of 387 million dollars. lOS Efforts to enact prenatal substance
abuse legislation indicate that there is a growing awareness of the
effects of prenatal substance abuse: It may only be a matter of time
before prenatal substance abuse is challenged in a Maryland court.
Because prenatal substance abuse is bound to enter the courts, the
Maryland General Assembly should assume a proactive stance, .and
adopt a cogent plan for addressing fetal substance exposure, which
respects the rights of both mother and fetus.
VI.

RECOMME~DA TIONS

FOR LEGISLATION

Maryland. has enacted many laws providing for comprehensive
health services for. singular problems. Similar laws would be appropriate to address the concerns of substance abuse in pregnancy. One
such law requires the establishment of a program for early identification and treatment of infants at risk for developing a hearing
impairment. 206 Similar statutes related to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome explicitly detail the State's expectation in the facilitation of the treatment of this illness.207 Laws are also in place
providing for the testing and education of those pregnant women at
risk for having children with sickle cell disease. 2os Similar legislation
established kidney disease program with attendant services209 and
an advisory council on arthritis and related diseases. 2lo These "health
promotion" laws provide guidelines and definitively establish programs for the evaluation and treatment of specific medical conditions.
They also provide education and direction for health care practitioners.

a

203. [d. The proposed bill identifies "chemically dependent" as "engaging in the
habitual or excessive use for a nonmedical purpose of any of the following
controlled substances or their derivatives: (I) amphetamine; (II) cocaine; (III)
heroin; (IV) methamphetamine; or (V) phencyclidine." [d.
204. [d.
205. Cocaine Babies' Cost: $504 Million Study Calls for Drug Treatment of MomsTo-Be, BALTIMORE EVENING SUN, Sept. IS, 1991, at A3.
206. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 13-602(a) (1990).
207. [d. § lS-333.
20S. [d. § lS-502.
209. [d. § 13-301 (1990 & Supp. 1993).
210. [d. § 13-502.
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The legislature has also explicitly directed medical practitioners
to provide specific interventions under certain circumstances. For
example, those who provide primary care to pregnant women are
mandated to perform blood sampling for syphilis at least twice during
the woman's pregnancy.21I Another law requires that the physician
or midwife attending the birth to administer certain prophylactic
medication to the infant immediately thereafter. 212 Clearly, the General Assembly is not adverse to legislating matters of far reaching
public health policy. Creating free-standing statutes to address particular health issues is not without precedent.
The Maryland legislature should craft prenatal substance abuse
laws which reflect the thoughtfulness of the statutes just discussed.
A realistic law would call for the establishment of an advisory council
to address the needs of high risk pregnant women. The law should
include provisions for mandatory prenatal substance abuse screening;
a method of educating both patients and health care practitioners;
authority to develop treatment programs geared to the peculiar needs
of the pregnant addict; and infant intervention programs for those
born exposed. Although the cost of such a comprehensive program
may initially be substantial, failure to act may result in even higher
costs in social services, education and medical care. Research suggests
that the costs of crime and other economic consequences of drug
abuse are actually lowered after treatment. 213 Rather than focusing
upon a mother's failures, such laws may prevent negative results by
directing medical practitioners to intervene early and follow through
with necessary treatment. Explicit language within an existing statute
would ensure that the issues of pregnant women with substance abuse
problems are addressed.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Prenatal substance abuse is a serious problem which can result
in potentially devastating effects to a fetus. Nevertheless, the right
of a fetus to be born healthy and free from injury, when weighed
against a mother's right to privacy and autonomy, is limited by
constitutional parameters and statutory construction. Unless laws
explicitly contemplate the fetus as a legal entity, criminal sanctions
against a mother will not be upheld. Although civil definitions of
neglect or abuse have been construed to protect the fetus, this
approach does not address the heart of the problem. Remedies which
211. [d. § 18-307 (1990).
212. [d. § 18-308.
213. NATIONAL AssocIATION OF STATE ALCOHOL AND

DRUG ABUSE DIRECTORS, TREATMENT WORKS: THE TRAGIC COST OF UNDERVALUING TREATMENT IN THE "DRUG

WAR," 24 (1990).

1993)
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serve only to protect the child do nothing to curb the problem of
maternal substance abuse. A comprehensive approach to prevention
and treatment for mother and child must be instituted. The Maryland
General Assembly should enact a statute designed specifically to
address the problem of prenatal substance abuse. Until either the
Maryland General Assembly or the Maryland courts address prenatal
substance abuse, the citizens of Maryland will continue to bear the
long-term costs associated with infants who are born exposed to
alcohol and drugs.
Mary J. Pizzo

